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Abstract
This paper considers an endogenous growth model with human capital accumula-
tion. It gives su¢ cient conditions and a necessary condition for the existence of a
unique competitive equilibrium with externalities. These conditions are more strin-
gent than those which prevail for the existence of an equilibrium de￿ned as the
solution to a ￿xed-point problem.
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1 Introduction
In his well-known 1988 model of endogenous growth with external e⁄ects,
Lucas de￿nes the equilibrium as the solution to a ￿xed-point problem. Initi-
ated by Arrow (1965) and Romer (1986), this de￿nition is now widely used
in macroeconomics. However, the equilibrium that is generated by such a
de￿nition does not necessarily coincide with a competitive equilibrium with
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Preprint submitted to Elsevier Science 4 June 2005externalities. In this paper, we illustrate this idea using a simple human cap-
ital driven endogenous growth model to show that the family of ￿competitive
equilibria￿is contained in the family of ￿equilibria￿ .
The model we use is a modi￿ed version of Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988)
with no physical capital nor population growth. By reducing the economy to
a single sector we drastically increase the tractability of the model. Neverthe-
less, since such a framework has been barely used in the literature 2 , a natural
extension of our work would be to consider physical capital accumulation.
Another key characteristic of our model hinges on the human capital accumu-
lation speci￿cation that is supposed to be an increasing and concave function
of the schooling e⁄ort. Uzawa (1965) makes the same assumption (see also
CaballØ and Santos, 1993 or Chamley, 1993) while Lucas (1988) assumes it is
simply linear.
Considering this simple economy with human capital externalities, we ￿rst
characterize the equilibrium de￿ned as the solution to a ￿xed point problem
and obtain the following results: (i) if the exogenous maximal growth rate is
greater than the discount rate, the equilibrium growth rate is strictly positive
for at least some time. (ii) A path is an equilibrium if and only if it satis￿es
the Euler equation and a transversality condition of the optimal growth prob-
lem. Notably, the transversality condition is shown to be necessary using the
assumption on parameters that guaranties that the optimization problem is
restricted to a set of consumption paths that yield a bounded intertemporal
utility. (iii) There exists a unique equilibrium and along this equilibrium, the
growth rate is constant. Remark there is also a continuum of solutions to the
Euler equation, along which the growth rate converges to the maximal growth
rate, but we show they violate the transversality condition. As a consequence,
the human capital driven endogenous growth model we consider has a rather
simple dynamic behavior and does not generate indeterminacies: this features
distinguishes it from its multi-sector counterpart (See Boldrin and Rustichini,
1994, Benhabib and Perli, 1994, Xie, 1994, and Alonso-Carrera and Freire-
SerØn, 2004).
Then, we characterize the competitive equilibrium demonstrating the following
results: (iv) any C2-competitive equilibrium is an equilibrium. Remark that
Gomez (2004) obtains the same result for the Uzawa (1965) - Lucas (1988)
model with human and physical capitals. Then, we derive our main result: (v)
an equilibrium is a C2-competitive equilibrium if the production function is
globally not too convex and only if the human capital technology is a strictly
concave function of the schooling e⁄ort. The ￿rst condition is similar as in Le
Van, Morhaim and Dimaria (2002) for the Romer (1986) model. The second
2 One of the exceptions is Lahiri (2001) who analyzes the impact of capital mobility
on indeterminacy.
2condition ensures the intertemporal labor income to be ￿nite when we use
equilibrium wages. It is satis￿ed in Le Van, Morhaim and Dimaria (2002)
who assume that the marginal productivity of the knowledge technology is
in￿nite at the origin. (vi) Using results (iii), (iv) and (v), we conclude that,
upon existence, the competitive equilibrium is unique. Finally, we point out
that when there is no externalities, and that the equilibrium consequently
coincides with the optimum, result (v) still hold. Hence, (vii) the optimum is
not a C2-competitive equilibrium if the human capital technology is a linear
function of the schooling e⁄ort.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
the assumptions. Section 3 and Section 4 respectively study the ￿xed-point
problem and the competitive equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a human capital driven endogenous growth model. Let ct; ut and ht
respectively denote the consumption, the labor supply and the human capital
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0 ￿ _ ht = ￿￿(1 ￿ ut)ht; h0 > 0given




0 ￿ ut ￿ 1
(P1)
where ￿ ht is an externality and where _ ht denotes the ￿rst di⁄erence with respect
to time. Parameters satisfy the following restrictions: ￿ 2 (0;1); ￿ > 0; ￿ > 0;
￿ 2 (0;1); ￿ > 0. Finally, ￿ is a function whose properties are discussed
below.
Observe that our problem could be extend to the case where the utility func-
tion is unbounded from below (i.e. for ￿ ￿ 0) by applying to the continuous
time environment the argument developed in Alvarez and Stokey (1998) or in
Le Van and Morhaim (2002). Moreover, assume:
H1 ￿ : [0;1] ! [0;1]; ￿(0) = 0; ￿(1) = 1; ￿0 > 0; ￿00 ￿ 0:
Assumption H1 implies ￿0 (0) ￿ 1; moreover 3 , ￿0 (0) = 1 is equivalent to
￿(x) = x.
3 Consider the function Z (x) = ￿(x) ￿ x with x 2 [0;1] and suppose ￿0 (0) = 1;
then Z0 (x) ￿ 0; since Z (0) = Z (1) = 0; conclude that Z (x) = 0.
3H2 ￿ > ￿.
Parameter ￿ measures the maximal possible growth rate. Assumption H2
hence introduces a lower bound to this rate.
H3 ￿ > ￿￿(￿ + ￿).
Assumption H3 ensures that the optimization problem is restricted to a set of
trajectories that yield a ￿nite intertemporal utility.
H4 The function h is piecewise C1 while functions c and u are piecewise con-
tinuous.
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(P2)
3 The solution to the ￿xed-point problem









. An equilibrium is a path ^ h such that





Lemma 2 Assume H1-H2; an equilibrium path ^ h could not be a constant path.
PROOF. Consider ￿rst an equilibrium path ^ h such that ^ ut = 1 where ^ ut is
the equilibrium value of u. In this case, ^ ht = h0; 8t. Consider another path
h which satis￿es the constraints in (P1) and is such that (i) ut = 1 ￿ " for
t 2 [0;￿] and ut = 1 for t > ￿ and (ii) ￿ ht = h0; 8t. Let ￿ denotes the di⁄erence










































Hence, assumptions H1 and H2 are su¢ cient to ensure lim"!0 (￿=") > 0. That
means that, given the externality ￿ h, h is not optimal: a contradiction. ￿
Lemma 3 Assume H1 and H3-H4; let h be a path which is C2 and satis￿es

























































In particular, it satis￿es:
_ ￿t =
￿￿0 (￿t)[￿ ￿ ￿t￿(￿ + ￿)] ￿ ￿(￿t)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿0 (￿t))
2 (￿(￿t))
￿1 ￿ ￿00 (￿t)
(3)
where ￿t = _ ht=ht.
PROOF. Let ^ h be an equilibrium; assume it is C2. It is easy to check that
(i) ^ h satis￿es the Euler condition (1), and (ii) the Euler equation (1) and the
transversality condition (2) are su¢ cient conditions for optimality. Let us now
prove that the transversality condition (2) is also necessary. Let Vt be the value




















0￿ _ hs ￿ ￿hs;8s ￿ t;
ht =^ ht given.




















0￿ _ x￿ ￿ ￿x￿;8￿ ￿ 0;
x0 =^ ht:
It is obvious that, 8t, Vt (0) = 0 and that Vt is concave. Moreover, Vt is























Now observe, using the budget constraints, that 8￿; ￿ ht+￿ ￿ ^ hte￿￿ and x￿ ￿

































Then, since Vt (ht) = Vt (ht) ￿ Vt (0) ￿ V 0
t (ht)ht, it yields that:
e
￿￿tVt (ht) ￿ ￿￿e
￿￿t￿
0












We hence obtain the transversality condition (2) by replacing ￿ ht by ht. Finally,
di⁄erentiating (1) and rearranging using ht = h0e
R t
0 ￿udu yields (3). ￿
Theorem 4 Assume H1-H4; there exists a unique C2￿equilibrium path ^ h; it
grows at a constant rate ^ ￿ such that:
^ ￿ =
￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)
if ￿
0 (0) = 1; (4)
^ ￿ >
￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)
if ￿
0 (0) > 1: (5)
PROOF. We proceed showing that (a) there exists a unique equilibrium path
that grows at a constant rate ^ ￿ 2 (0;￿); (b) there is no equilibrium path whose
growth rate is not constant.
6(a) Let us show that there exist two steady-states to (3): a ￿rst one denoted
^ ￿ that belongs to (0;￿) and which is unstable and an other one, ￿, which is
stable. With (3), de￿ne function G such that
G(￿) =
￿￿0 (￿)[￿ ￿ ￿￿(￿ + ￿)] ￿ ￿(￿)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿0 (￿))
2 (￿(￿))
￿1 ￿ ￿00 (￿)
:
Hence, ^ ￿ satis￿es G(^ ￿) = 0. Since, the denominator of G is strictly positive,
^ ￿ solves the equation:
￿(^ ￿)
￿0 (^ ￿)
￿ ^ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ^ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)]:
When ^ ￿ goes from 0 to ￿, using H1, the ￿rst member is non decreasing from
￿￿￿0 (0) to ￿￿, while, using H2-H3, the second decreases from ￿￿ to ￿￿ ￿
￿[1 ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)]. Hence, there exists a unique solution ^ ￿ for all ￿ 2 (0;￿). It
satis￿es ^ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)=[1 ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)] , ￿0 (0) ￿ 1.
Moreover, observe that, since ￿(￿) = 0, then G(￿) = 0 but remark that the
solution such that ￿t = ￿ for all t does not correspond to an optimal path
since the associated consumptions equals zero for all t.
Finally, some computations yields to:
G
0 (^ ￿) =
￿￿00 (^ ￿)[￿ ￿ ^ ￿￿(￿ + ￿)] ￿ ￿0 (^ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)]
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿0 (^ ￿))
2 (￿(^ ￿))
￿1 ￿ ￿00 (^ ￿)
:
Using H1-H3, concludes that G0 (^ ￿) > 0. Consequently ^ ￿ is unstable while ￿
is stable.
(b) Consider any solution (￿t) to (3) which is not constant over time. Since ^ ￿
is unstable, (￿t) either converges to 0 if ￿0 < ^ ￿ or converges to ￿ if ￿0 > ^ ￿.
Since 0 is not a steady-state, it cannot exist a solution such that ￿0 < ^ ￿. We
now show that solutions that converge to ￿ violate (2). De￿ne ￿rst function
J such that:








Hence, condition (2) is equivalent to limt!1 J (t) = 0. Now, observe that
￿(￿t) ￿ ￿￿0 (￿)"t with "t = ￿ ￿ ￿t. Hence, replace to obtain







Equivalently, with (3), one has: _ ￿t ￿ (￿t ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿(￿ + ￿))=(￿￿ ￿ 1); solv-
ing this equation, it yields that ￿￿0 (￿)"t ￿ Ae
(￿￿￿￿(￿+￿))t
(￿￿￿1) with A > 0. Then,












7Consequently, using H3, limt!1 J (t) = e
￿
￿(￿+￿)(1￿￿￿)A
(￿￿￿￿(￿+￿)) A￿￿￿1 > 0. ￿
4 The competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is well-de￿ned for some proper spaces of prices,
wages, consumption, human capital and labor. Since 0 ￿ _ ht ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ut)ht;
























Moreover, the price path p must be such that
R 1
0 ptctdt < 1 for any c 2 L1
c .













Firms have the information that labor supply is uniformly bounded. They











Consequently, the wage path must be such that
R 1
0 wtnthtdt < 1 for any
n 2 L1
n and any h 2 L1





















n is a competitive equilibrium with externalities if:
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_ ht = ￿￿(1 ￿ ut)ht; h0 > 0given
ct ￿ 0;0 ￿ ut ￿ 1
(11)








































Lemma 6 A C2￿competitive equilibrium is an equilibrium.
PROOF. We show that the solution to the competitive equilibrium attains
the max in problem (P1) and that the constraints and the equilibrium condi-
tion are satis￿ed. Remark ￿rst that (i) the equilibrium condition is necessarily
satis￿ed in the competitive equilibrium, that (ii) constraints on _ ht and ut are
satis￿ed by construction, and that (iii) the constraint on ct is satis￿ed by the
market clearing condition on the competitive equilibrium.





￿+￿ and c be a feasible path such
that ct = (utht)
￿ (h￿
t)
￿. Consider the program (11). It can be easily shown
thatthere exists ￿ > 0 such that ￿p￿
t = e￿￿t (c￿
t)











t e￿￿tdt. Using the concavity of the utility function,










t ￿ ct]dt ￿ 0. Using the constraint (11), it turns














tuthtdt, where the max is taken over all (u;h)
which satisfy the ￿rst constraint in (P1). Suppose it is not true and that
















tuthtdt+￿￿. Then it should exist a function ", which is




t + ")dt <
R 1
0 w￿














Lemma 7 Assume H1-H4.







the equilibrium is a C2￿competitive equilibrium.
(ii) If ￿0 (0) = 1, there is no C2￿competitive equilibrium.
4 Remark that it is equivalent to choose the path (nh)
￿ :
9PROOF. At the equilibrium, one has, up to a positive scalar, ^ pt = e￿￿t (^ ct)
￿￿1,









￿. We proceed showing that,
at the equilibrium: (a) the consumer satisfaction is maximized, (b) the ￿rm
pro￿t is maximized, (c) the wage path belongs to L1
w only if ￿0 (0) > 1, and
(d) the price path belongs to L1
p if ￿0 (0) > 1 and ￿+￿ ￿ 1+" for some " > 0.























t )=￿ ￿ ^ c
￿￿1




^ pt (^ ct ￿ ct)dt:
Then, using the consumer￿ s budget constraint and recalling that ut = ￿(￿)
where ￿ = (dht=dt)=ht, one has:
Z 1
0





￿(^ ￿)^ ht ￿ ￿(￿)ht
i
dt:




^ wt [￿(^ ￿) ￿ ￿
0 (^ ￿)^ ￿]
￿





























[￿(^ ￿) ￿ ￿
0 (^ ￿)^ ￿]
￿





















Now, replacing the Euler condition for problem (P2) in the ￿rst integral of













^ ht ￿ ht
￿￿1
0









10Using the transversality condition for problem (P2), conclude that ￿ ￿ 0:






￿￿1 = ^ wt^ ht:
By replacing ^ pt and ^ wt conclude that it is true.
(c) The equilibrium wage path belongs to L1
w, only if ￿0 (0) > 1. Replacing
















Observe with Theorem 1 that this integral is ￿nite when ￿0 (0) > 1 because
^ ￿ > (￿ ￿ ￿)=[1 ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)] and that, when ￿0 (0) = 1; the integral is in￿nite.
(d) The equilibrium price path belongs to L1
p if ￿0 (0) > 1 and ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1 + "













The integral is ￿nite if ^ ￿ > [￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿]=[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿)]. Deduce from
Theorem 1, that the latter inequality is true for ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1: Since ^ ￿ is
continuous with respect to (￿ + ￿) and since the function ￿ 2 ]0;+1[ !
[￿￿ ￿ ￿]=[(1 ￿ ￿)￿] is increasing, then, for " > 0, su¢ ciently small, if 0 <
￿ + ￿ ￿ 1 + ", then ^ ￿ > [￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿]=[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿)]. Moreover, since
￿ + ￿ < ￿=￿￿, we obtain that ￿ + ￿ < minf1;￿=￿￿g + " implies that
^ ￿ > [￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿]=[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿)]. ￿
As a corollary of lemmas 3 and 4, we have:
Theorem 8 (i) Assume H1-H4 and ￿0 (0) > 1; there exists " > 0 such that if






+ ", then there exists a unique C2￿competitive equilibrium.
(ii) Assume H1-H4 and ￿0 (0) = 1; there is no competitive equilibrium.
PROOF. Given the previous results, it is immediate. ￿
Corollary 9 When there is no externalities (i.e. for ￿ = 0), the optimal
solution is a C2￿competitive equilibrium if ￿0 (0) > 1 while it is not if ￿0 (0) =
1.
115 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a simple economic model in which human
capital accumulation yields endogenous growth. We use this framework to
show that equilibria de￿ned as the solution to a ￿xed-point problem, aren￿ t
always competitive equilibria with externalities. This result hinges on the ex-
istence conditions which are more stringent for a competitive equilibrium. In a
nutshell, the equilibrium may exist provided that the optimization problem is
restricted to a set of trajectories that yield a ￿nite utility while the existence
of the competitive equilibrium requires further restrictions on the spaces of
prices and wages. Consequently, there is little doubt that our result extend
to more relevent economic models that should include, for instance, physical
capital. Nevertheless, the formal demonstration would not be easy since it
requires to prove the existence of a solution to the ￿xed-point problem.
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